It is well-known that knowledgebases may contain inconsistencies. We provide a framework of measures, based on a first-order four-valued logic, to quantify the inconsistency of a knowledgebase. This allows for the comparison of the inconsistency of diverse knowledgebases that have been represented as sets of first-order logic formulae. We motivate the approach by considering some examples of knowledgebases for representing and reasoning with ontological knowledge and with temporal knowledge. Analysing ontological knowledge (including the statements about which concepts are subconcepts of other concepts, and which concepts are disjoint) can be problematical when there is a lack of knowledge about the instances that may populate the concepts, and analysing temporal knowledge (such as temporal integrity constraints) can be problematical when considering infinite linear time lines isomorphic to the natural numbers or the real numbers or more complex structures such as branching time lines. We address these difficulties by providing algebraic measures of inconsistency in first-order knowledgebases.
Introduction
The need for handling inconsistencies in knowledgebases has been well recognized in recent years. Inconsistencies may arise for various reasons such as when information sources are merged or in the presence of integrity constraints. The use of first-order logic becomes problematical because a single (local) inconsistency leads to the (global) inconsistency of the entire knowledgebase. Paraconsistent logics allow for local inconsistency without global inconsistency. Paraconsistent reasoning is important in handling inconsistent information, and there have been a number of proposals for paraconsistent logics, such as Da Costa's C ω logics [dC74] , developments of C systems [CM02] , Priest's three-valued logic LPm [Pri89], Belnap's fourvalued logic [Bel77] , and versions of Belnap's four-valued logic restricted to minimal models [AA98] , for reasoning with inconsistent information. Further approaches, such as techniques for analysing and querying inconsistent databases and knowledgebases [ABK00, BC03, dCM02, MPS
+ 07], techniques for merging knowledgebases [BKMS92, LM98, KP98, BDKP00] , and analytical techniques for inconsistent software specifications [HN98] , have been proposed (for reviews of some applications see [GS00, BHS04] ). Whilst these methods provide potentially valuable ways of using inconsistent knowledgebases, they do not provide an adequate way of summarising the nature of the inconsistencies.
Our interest in this paper is in providing a measure for the inconsistency of a knowledgebase represented as a set of first-order logic formulae. By providing such a measure we can compare different knowledgebases and evaluate their quality of information. If given the opportunity to choose between different knowledgebases, we may try to choose the one that is least inconsistent.
Four-valued paraconsistent logics have been used as the basis of an approach to measuring inconsistency in knowledgebases [Hun02, Hun03, GH06] . In this, each inconsistent set of formulae is reflected in the four-valued models for the set, and then the inconsistency is measured in the models. This approach to measuring inconsistency has already been seen as a useful tool in analysing a diverse range of information types including news reports [Hun06] , integrity constraints [GH06] , ontologies [MQHL07] , software specifications [BPF04, MJLL05] , and ecommerce protocols [CZZ04] . However, this approach of measuring inconsistency has been restricted to either a propositional language or a language with predicates but without function symbols.
In this paper, we present a framework for measuring inconsistency for a full first-order language, together with examples in analysing ontological and temporal knowledge. Dealing with a full first-order language is potentially important in diverse applications (such as reasoning about specifications [FGH + 94]), but it does also raise issues with regard to analysing arbitrarily large, including infinite, domains. To address these issues, our framework provides algebraic measures of inconsistency in first-order knowledgebases.
Overview of our approach
In this section, we provide an informal overview of our approach together with some examples to motivate and illustrate our approach. We start by recalling that many diverse applications in computer science require the ability to represent and reason with knowledge in a form that is more expressive than propositional logic. Furthermore, in many applications, there is a need to analyse inconsistency arising in knowledge.
To illustrate the need for systems and/or users to analyse inconsistency, consider diverse applications such as tools for analysing formal software specifications (where parts of the specifications may have come from different sources), systems for disambiguation in natural language processing (where there are conflicting syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic parses of the text/speech being parsed), and tools for developing ontologies based on description logics (where there may be multiple ontologies perhaps from multiple sources that need to be combined by an ontology engineer into a single coherent and consistent ontology). In these examples, and in many other potential applications, there is either the need for an automatic system to analyse the degree of inconsistency arising in the available knowledge, or there is the need for a system to provide a user (such as a software or knowledge engineer) with an assessment of the degree of inconsistency arising in the available knowledge. Once the system/user has access to an assessment of the degree of inconsistency, the system/user can make a more intelligent and better informed decision on the course of action to take on the inconsistency.
In this paper we assume a knowledgebase is a set of formulae of classical first-order logic. We impose no restrictions on this. It can include function symbols, variable symbols, and quantifier symbols. And of course, a knowledgebase can be inconsistent, and indeed, any formula in a knowledgebase may be inconsistent.
Our approach to measuring inconsistency in a knowledgebase is to consider the "four-valued models" of it. Each of these models is based on what we call a bistructure, which essentially is a pair of classical interpretations: One of these interpretations is used for the satisfaction of positive literals (i.e. the atoms), and the other is used for the satisfaction of negative literals. So in a bistructure, both an atom and its negation, or neither, can be satisfied. This gives a four-valued semantics, so that an atom may be regarded as being exactly one of "true" or "false" or "both true and false" or "neither true nor false" in a bistructure. The semantics for more complex formulae is given by a generalization of Belnap's four valued logic, which is a paraconsistent logic that we call tolerant logic. For our purposes, this semantics is simple and for any knowledgebase the set of models for it is always non-empty.
Given a bistructure, we apply a simple measure of inconsistency, denoted Inc, that gives the proportion of the tuples in the bistructure that are in conflict. The amount of conflict in a bistructure is the number of tuples that are both true and false. This is normalized by the total number of tuples that are possible in the interpretations (which is a function of the size of the domain), so we get a value in the [0, 1] interval. For example, if we have a bistructure with just one monadic relation R and two domain objects a 1 and a 2 , and the first classical interpretation has both a 1 and a 2 (for R), and the second classical interpretation has a 1 (for ¬R), then there is conflict with respect to the tuple a 1 and so the proportion of tuples in conflict is 1/2. Note, this measure is not restricted to Herbrand interpretations.
We then generalize this measure of inconsistency to sets of bistructures. In order to set up our framework, and consider various properties, we deal with sets of bistructures in general. But in practice, if we want to analyse a knowledgebase, we consider the set of models for the knowledgebase.
For a knowledgebase, since our measure of inconsistency of a model is dependent on the domain size, we consider the models for each domain size in turn. For each domain size, we find the minimum degree of inconsistency in a model from the models of this size, using a function denoted MicroInc, and then we summarize this value obtained for each size in the form of a ratio of univariate polynomial functions (i.e. a rational function) where the variable is the cardinality of the domain. The polynomial that is the numerator gives the minimum number of tuples in conflict for the models of domain size n, and the polynomial that is the denominator gives the maximum number of tuples in the models of domain size n. By representing the degree of inconsistency in the form of such a rational function, we have a concise summary of the nature of the inconsistency for any domain size. Furthermore, it provides a direct way of comparing knowledgebases in terms of their respective rational functions.
To illustrate our approach, we now look at examples of knowledgebases to show some of the key aspects of measuring inconsistency. We start with some simple examples based on pairs of formulae taken from the following list of formulae A1 -A7. For each pair we consider, for example (A2,A3), imagine there are two agents who have provided the formulae, and these two agents need to jointly provide a formula that they both can agree on. Perhaps the agents need to do this as part of a requirements capture process for some software system for which the agents are stakeholders. So each formula represents the requirements of one of the agents. By measuring the inconsistency of the union of the two formulae, we get a measure of how divergent the two agents are in their positions. Furthermore, if the agents are negotiating, they may withdraw one or both formulae, and replace them with formulae that are less inconsistent. Such a negotiation may be undertaken with the aim of finding a pair of formulae that are consistent together.
For the pair (A1,A2), we may describe this as an "atomic conflict" (A1 says one domain object is in the interpretation for P whereas A2 says that one domain object is in the interpretation for the negation of P ). For the pairs (A2,A3) and (A3,A4), we have something similar to the case for (A1,A2), in that there is at least one domain object in conflict. So, for each of the pairs (A1,A2), (A2,A3), and (A3,A4), if our knowledgebase contains just the two formulae in the pair, then we will calculate the measure of inconsistency as the rational function 1/n, and in the limit, as n goes to infinity, the degree of inconsistency is 0.
For the pairs (A3,A5) and (A3,A6), we have more significant inconsistency. In the models, all domain objects are in conflict in each pair. So, for each of (A3,A5) and (A3,A6), if the knowledgebase contains just the two formulae in the pair, then we will calculate the measure of inconsistency as the rational function n/n, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency is 1.
For the pair (A3,A7), we have something similar to the pair (A3,A6), but here we also need to consider the function symbol f in the right formula. If we consider the models with the fewest conflicts (which we will see are the models we want to base our measures on), then the interpretation of the function symbol should be a constant function, i.e. there is c ∈ D such that for all d ∈ D, f (d) = c. In this case, there is one domain object in conflict, namely the c just mentioned. So, for (A3,A7), if the knowledgebase contains just the two formulae in the pair, then we will calculate the measure of inconsistency as the rational function 1/n, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency is 0.
We now consider examples of ontological knowledge. Whilst description logics are now the leading approach to formalising ontological knowledge, the basic description logics are actually subsystems of classical logic; so it is straightforward to present examples of ontological knowledge in the form of classical logic. For this, we adopt the following conventions: (1) A concept P is represented by a monadic predicate P (x); (2) An individual c that is a member of a concept P is represented by a ground predicate P (c); (3) The relationship that the concept Q is a subconcept of the concept P is represented by ∀x.Q(x) → P (x); and (4) The relationship that the concept Q is disjoint with the concept P is represented by ∀x.
We see a key advantage of our approach for analysing an ontology (when it is under development) if we consider the need to analyse the structure (i.e. the concepts and their inter-relationships) without knowing about the instances that may populate it. For example, for a medical records ontology, the ontology engineer should have obtained knowledge that for example the concept heart surgery is a subclass of the concept surgery, and that male and female are disjoint concepts, but the ontology engineer cannot be expected to have a list of all the patients of the hospital in the future. Hence, when the ontology is being developed, the number of instances that will be in the ontology is unknown. Our approach directly deals with this issue, since we can consider an arbitrarily large number of instances, which we do by considering an arbitrary-sized domain. In other words, our measure of inconsistency, captured by a rational function, is a representation of the inconsistency for each domain size.
We start by considering the formulae B1 -B4. These formulae are not inconsistent. They say that S is a subconcept of R, Q is a subconcept of P , Q and S are disjoint, and P and R are disjoint. However, if we also have the assumption B5 that says that there is an instance in S and Q, then we do have an inconsistency.
So without knowing anything about the actual membership of these concepts, we can analyse the inconsistency in this ontological knowledge. For B1 -B5, we will see in Example 15, that the rational function is 1/n. This means that as the size of the domain increases, the inconsistency is diluted, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency is reduced to zero.
As another example of ontological knowledge, consider C1 -C7 which are inconsistent. For this, we will see (in Example 17) that the degree of inconsistency is given by the rational function 1/3. So as the size of the domain increases, the inconsistency is not diluted, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency is 1/3. Furthermore, if we compare B1 -B5 and C1 -C7, for n > 3, the rational function for C1 -C7 is always greater than that for B1 -B5, and so we can regard C1 -C7 as more inconsistent than B1 -B5.
We now turn to temporal knowledge. The following set of formulae D1 -D3 is consistent in classical logic but the set is only satisfied by an infinite model such as one based on the sequence of the natural numbers. Such a set of formulae may appear as part of a specification for time-stamping locutions in a dialogue protocol between two interacting agents.
Now suppose the formula D4 is added to D1 -D3; then the set is inconsistent. However, in a sense, the conflict is extremely small, and so any bistructure for it is "overwhelmingly consistent". In contrast, if the following formula D5 is added to D1 -D3, then the set is inconsistent, and in a sense, the conflict is extremely large, and so any bistructure for it is "substantially inconsistent".
In our framework, we will provide a degree of inconsistency to account for inconsistency in infinite models (allowing us for example to differentiate between the inconsistency in the set {D1,D2,D3,D4}, and the set {D1,D2,D3,D5}), and explore some of the relationships between them, as well as with the degree of inconsistency for finite models. We will also provide a measure of the consistency of an infinite model which provides an alternative dimension for analysing an infinite model.
Since the proposal in this paper is the first proposal for measuring inconsistency in full first-order logic (including infinite models), our approach offers considerable advantages for applications in artificial intelligence and computer science involving first-order knowledge. A number of other proposals have been made for measuring the degree of information in the presence of inconsistency [Loz94, WB01, Kni03, KLM03] , and for measuring the degree of inconsistency in information [Gra78, Kni01, SJ01, Hun02, Kni03, KLM03, Hun04, Hun03, HK04, GH06, HK06]. All these proposals are based on propositional logic, apart from [Gra78] and [GH06] , with the former primarily investigating the mathematical structure of various inconsistency measures, while the latter is based on a restricted form of first-order logic. Furthermore, there are six key improvements in this new paper over the [GH06] paper:
1. In [GH06] we only considered a restricted first-order language with universal and existential quanitification but without function symbols (apart from constant symbols) whereas in this paper we consider full first-order logic, and therefore in this paper we are able to handle a wider range of knowledgebases.
2. In [GH06] we only considered Herbrand interpretations, whereas in this paper, we consider any first-order interpretation, and therefore we drop some constraints that are inappropriate for some applications.
3. In [GH06] we only considered finite interpretations, whereas in this paper, we consider both finite and infinite interpretations, and therefore in this paper we are able to handle a wider range of knowledgebases.
4. In [GH06] we used quasi-classical logic to find the four-valued models of a knowledgebase, whereas in this paper we use a first-order version of Belnap's logic, and as a result we have a simpler logic for finding the models for a knowledgebase.
5. In [GH06] the measure of inconsistency for a knowledgebase was summarized by a sequence of numbers n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , . . . (where n 1 is the measure for a domain of cardinality 1, n 2 is the measure for a domain of cardinality 2, and so on), whereas in this paper, the measure of inconsistency for a knowledgebase is summarised by a ratio of univariate polynomial functions (i.e. a rational function).
6. In [GH06] we did not consider limit behaviour of measures, whereas in this paper we provide a characterization of measures in terms of limit behaviour.
In the following sections, we formalize our approach a follows. In Section 3 we review the basic definitions for the language and semantics of first-order logic that we require. In Section 4 we present a first-order version of the semantics for Belnap's four-valued logic, called tolerant logic, that we will use to find the models for a knowledgebase. In Section 5 we consider some classes of interpretations that allow us to restrict the models considered for a knowledgebase (e.g. for temporal knowledge, we may wish to restrict consideration to models with elements corresponding to the real numbers). In Section 6 we consider measures for a finite set of finite models (which we call a bounded frame), for a set of finite models that includes a model of every domain size (which we call an unbounded frame), and for a set of models that includes an infinite model (which we call an infinite frame). In Section 7 we consider a framework for measuring consistency which is a counterpart to our framework for measuring inconsistency. Finally, in Section 8 we show that the semantics for tolerant logic subsumes the semantics for Belnap's logic.
Basic definitions for a first-order logic
In this section, we provide some basic definitions and notation that are used for presenting a first-order logic (FOL).
The language for FOL contains logical symbols: connectives {¬, ∨, ∧, →}, quantifiers {∀, ∃}, punctuation symbols (parentheses, comma, and period), and an infinite set of variables. A specific language L is determined by its predicate, constant, and function symbols; these we consider the nonlogical symbols that must be provided in a language. We assume that the number of predicate and function symbols is finite. We sometimes write P (n) to indicate that P is an n-ary predicate symbol.
We adopt the following conventions for our notation.
• uppercase letters like P and R for predicate symbols.
• lowercase letters like f , g, and h, perhaps with subscript, for function symbols.
• lowercase letters like a, b, c, and d, perhaps with subscript, for constant symbols.
• lowercase letters like x and y, perhaps with subscript, for variable symbols.
• lowercase letters like t and s, perhaps with subscript, for terms.
We assume the usual classical definitions for a language including definitions for a free variable, a bound variable, and a ground formula. An atom is of the form P (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where t 1 , . . . , t n are terms. As usual, a literal is either an atom or the negation of an atom. The set of formulae is defined by the usual inductive definitions for classical logic. We use the Greek letters α, β, γ for literals, φ for a clause (a disjunction of literals), ψ for a conjunction of clauses, and θ for any formula. For a language L, the set of formulae that can be formed by the usual inductive definitions is denoted Formulae(L). We will usually not specify L and assume that given a knowledgebase ∆, L is the language that contains exactly the nonlogical (i.e. constant, function, and predicate) symbols that appear in ∆.
We now consider the classical semantics for FOL. 
For every function symbol f of arity
3. For every predicate symbol P of arity n > 0, I(P ) ⊆ D n is an n-ary relation.
We handle variables in FOL formulae using the standard notion of an assignment. Whilst the definitions for language and interpretations considered in this section are those of classical logic, we will use them for a paraconsistent logic in the next section.
In order to consider properties of our framework, we also require the classical consequence relation, denoted . We assume ⊥ is shorthand for any classically inconsistent formula. However, in order to simplify the presentation we assume that ⊥ is not in the language L. For a knowledgebase ∆ ⊆ Formulae(L), as a shorthand we write ∆ ⊥ to indicate that ∆ is inconsistent in classical logic; otherwise we write ∆ ⊥.
Tolerant logic
We now present the definitions for tolerant logic which is a first-order four-valued logic. The language for tolerant logic is that of FOL. However, the semantics is different; that is why tolerant logic supports paraconsistent reasoning.
The notion of a bistructure in tolerant logic is based on the notion of a classical interpretation. The basic difference is that for tolerant logic we use a pair of classical interpretations to give a tolerant interpretation. + (c) = I − (c), and for all function symbols f ,
The above definition ensures that in a bistructure (D, I + , I − ) both the classical interpretations I + and I − use the same domain object for each constant symbol, and the same function in the domain for each function symbol. Therefore the classical interpretations I + and I − in a bistructure can only differ in their assignment to predicate symbols. As a result, we can use I + as the interpretation for positive literals and I − as the interpretation for negative literals. This is formalized in the definition for decoupled satisfaction.
Definition 4. For a bistructure E = (D, I
+ , I − ) and an assignment A, we define a satisfiability relation, |= d , called decoupled satisfaction for literals in L as follows:
where for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Since we allow both an atom and its complement to be satisfiable, we have decoupled, at the level of the structure, the link between an atom and its complement. In contrast, if a classical structure satisfies a literal, then it is forced to not satisfy the complement of the literal. This decoupling gives the basis for a semantics for paraconsistent reasoning.
In the following definition for satisfiability for arbitrary formulae, we provide a partial coupling (i.e. a coupling that is weaker than in classical logic) for a formula and its complement. In the propositional case, this definition of satisfiability coincides with that of Belnap's four-valued logic [Bel77] , which is a propositional logic that has a four-valued lattice-theoretic interpretation of connectives (see Theorem 5).
Definition 5. Let E be a bistructure and let A be an assignment. The satisfiability relation, denoted |=, is defined by induction on the length of a formula as follows where α is a literal, and θ, θ 1 , and θ 2 are arbitrary formulae.
In Definition 5, the first condition defines satisfaction for literals, the second to fourth conditions define satisfaction for conjunction, disjunction, and implication, respectively, the fifth to eighth conditions define satisfaction for negation, and the ninth to twelfth conditions define satisfaction for quantification. We extend satisfaction to a bistructure in the next definition.
Definition 6. Let E be a bistructure and θ an arbitrary formula. 
Here, we see that d 1 , d 3 is in both I + (P ) and
Hence, for all assignments A, we get E |= P (c 1 , c 3 ) and E |= ¬P (c 1 , c 3 ). In contrast, we see that
Next we define the concept of a model.
Definition 7. Let ∆ be a set of formulae and let
In the next section, we will consider classes of models for tolerant logic and then we will return to studying Tolerant Logic, in Section 8, where we will show how tolerant logic generalizes Belnap's logic.
Classes of models for knowledgebases
We start with the class of all models for a knowledgebase (Definition 8) and then consider subclasses (Definitions 9 -13) that will allow us to focus our analysis of inconsistency in knowledgebases using appropriate assumptions without having to add extra formulae to a knowledgebase or add further constraints on the semantics.
Definition 8. For a set of formulae
Next we consider a definition that gives the models that satisfy the unique names assumption (UNA), meaning that different constant symbols are assigned to different objects in the domain. In other words, each constant is treated as a unique name.
Definition 9. Let ∆ be a set of formulae.
3 } and the interpretations I + and I − are as follows.
As an illustration of the utility of measures of inconsistency, we will consider in the next section some examples of knowledgebases that define sets and subsets of concepts (i.e. a form of ontological knowledge). For this, we will use the following class of models.
Definition 10. Let ∆ be a set of formulae. 
We will also consider the measurement of inconsistency in temporal knowledge. To facilitate this, we consider models that conform to particular flows of time. Often temporal knowledge is represented using linear time lines, isomorphic to some or all of the natural numbers or the real numbers, or more complex structures such as branching time lines. These structures raise particular difficulties for analysis in the case of inconsistency.
For modelling time flows, we need a predicate t 1 t 2 where t 1 is before t 2 in the flow of time. The language L may also contain additional predicate symbols as needed for the application. We also assume the following languages for use with time flows: L k is the language that includes the relation and the constant symbols for the sequence of natural numbers from 1 to k; L p is the language that includes the relation and the constant symbols for the natural numbers (positive integers); and L i is the language that includes the relation and the constant symbols for the integers.
Definition 11. Let ∆ ⊆ Formulae(L k ) be a set of formulae. 
We can regard FPModels(∆) as the models of ∆ that are finite linear time models isomorphic to a subset of the natural numbers (and so FP stands for finite positive integer models), CPModels(∆) as the models of ∆ that are linear time models isomorphic to the natural numbers (and so CP stands for countable positive integer models), and CIModels(∆) as the models of ∆ that are linear time models isomorphic to the integers (and so CI stands for countable integer models).
In the following examples, we use the usual symbols for numbers for illustrating the elements of the domain and for use as constant symbols in the language. It may be desirable in some situations, to use a different symbol for a number in the domain and a number in the language, so that the difference between them is explicit. 
+ (3) = 3; I + (4) = 4; I + (5) = 5; I + (6) = 6; I + (7) = 7;
Example 5. Let E = (D, I
+ , I − ) be such that D = N and the interpretations I + and I − are as follows.
We can define further classes of models as required to capture for example continuous flows of time isomorphic to the real numbers and branching flows of time. We may also consider further constraints such as domain closure axioms (e.g. [Rei80] ). Whilst we have not considered equality in this paper, it is possible to either adapt the definition for tolerant logic to support an equality relation in the semantics (in which case, it may be appropriate to assume that for any knowledgebase, the equality relation is never both true and false), or a form of quasi-equality is introduced by axiomatization (as proposed in [GH06] ).
For every set of formulae ∆, Models(∆) is non-empty. Furthermore, for every n ∈ N, and for every ∆, there is a model E ∈ Models(∆) such that E = (D, I + , I − ) and |D| = n. Even if the formulae in ∆ involve many constant symbols, there may be an interpretation that assigns the same element in the domain to some or all of these constant symbols. It is only when we deal with special classes of models such as UNAModels(∆) that we eliminate these possibilities.
Framework for measuring inconsistency
For a bistructure E = (D, I
+ , I − ), let Domain(E) = D. In general, we can consider two disjoint possibilities for |Domain(E)| for any bistructure E: These are that |Domain(E)| is finite or that |Domain(E)| is infinite. In the following, we will provide a framework that measures inconsistency for both these cases.
For the rest of the paper, a set of bistructures is called a frame. We adopt the following nomenclature for describing a frame Φ.
• Φ is a bounded frame iff ∃n ∈ N such that ∀E ∈ Φ |Domain(E)| ≤ n.
• Φ is an unbounded frame iff ∃m ∈ N ∀n ∈ N (n ≥ m implies ∃E ∈ Φ |Domain(E)| = n).
• Φ is an infinite frame iff ∃E ∈ Φ such that |Domain(E)| ≥ ℵ 0 .
An example of a bounded frame is given by a singleton set containing just the bistructure given in Example 4. An example of an unbounded frame is given by Models(∆) when ∆ = {∀x, y.P (x, y)}. An example of an infinite frame is given by a singleton set containing just the bistructure given in Example 5.
Obviously, if Φ is a bounded frame, then Φ is not an unbounded frame, and Φ is not an infinite frame. But it is possible that Φ is both an unbounded frame and an infinite frame.
For a frame Φ, any Φ ⊆ Φ is called a subframe. Obviously, if Φ is unbounded, there are subframes of Φ that are bounded. If Φ is an infinite frame, there may be a subframe that is unbounded, and there may be a subframe that is bounded. To support consideration of subframes, we draw on the following two subsidiary definitions.
Some of the key definitions in the rest of this paper will be based on analysing the bistructures in a frame. We introduce the notions of bounded, unbounded, and infinite frames to provide a general way of presenting our framework for measuring inconsistency. We will give definitions for a measure for inconsistency in a bistructure (Definition 16), a measure for inconsistency in a bounded frame (Definition 17), a measure for inconsistency in an unbounded frame (Definition 20), and a measure for inconsistency in an infinite frame (Definition 25). Normally, we expect each frame to be a set of models for a knowledgebase ∆, such as Models(∆), UNAModels(∆), ConceptModels(∆), or CPModels(∆). But since there are many possible classes of models that we could consider (Section 5 only considers some of the possible classes), it is simpler and more general to define our framework of measures in terms of frames rather than directly in terms of particular classes of models for knowledgebases.
Measuring inconsistency in a bistructure
We start by considering how to measure the inconsistency of a bistructure. We assume that we are given a language L and E = (D, I
+ , I − ) is a bistructure for L. The nonlogical symbols considered in the definitions and examples are assumed to be in L.
Definition 14. Let E = (D, I
+ , I − ) be a bistructure, and let Π be a set of predicate symbols.
The following definition gives an upper bound on CollisionCount given a set of predicate symbols and a bistructure.
Definition 15. Let E = (D, I
and
Hence, CollisionCount({P, Q}, E) = 2 since,
and UniverseCount({P, Q}, E) = 12 since,
In the definition of UniverseCount(Π, E), it does not make sense to let Π = ∅, and so for the rest of this paper, we assume that Π is always non-empty. Having Π as a parameter allows us to focus on particular subsets of predicate symbols during an analysis of a model or set of models. This is valuable, since when considering arbitrarily large domains, the value obtained by CollisionCount for some predicate symbols may "drown out" the CollisionCount for other predicate symbols.
We bring together the measure of CollisionCount and UniverseCount in the following definition for the measure of inconsistency for a set of predicate symbols in a bistructure with a finite domain.
Definition 16. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols and let E be a bistructure. The bistructure degree of inconsistency of (Π, E), denoted Inc(Π, E), is defined as follows: If 0 < UniverseCount(Π, E) < ∞, then
otherwise Inc(Π, E) = 0.
Example 7. Continuing Example 6, Inc(Π, E) = 2/12 = 1/6, where Π = {P, Q}.
The following are some simple observations concerning the Inc function.
• For any Π and E, 0 ≤ Inc(Π, E) ≤ 1.
• For any Π and E, if Inc(Π, E) = 1, then for all Π ⊆ Π, Inc(Π , E) = 1.
• For any Π and E, if Inc(Π, E) = 0, then for all Π ⊆ Π, Inc(Π , E) = 0.
In tolerant logic for any knowledgebase there is always a model. This model can be obtained by taking each atom in the language of the knowledgebase, and letting the model satisfy the atom and the negation of the atom. This model gives the maximum degree of inconsistency, as formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. For all ∆, there is an E ∈ Models(∆), such that Inc(Π, E) = 1 where Π is the set of all predicate symbols in ∆.
Proof. Consider the bistructure E that for each n-ary P i ∈ Π, and d 1 , ..,
Bounded degree of inconsistency
Now we consider the measure of inconsistency for a bounded frame. It is particularly useful if there is a maximum finite size for the intended models. Essentially, it takes a credulous point of view by using the bistructure, from the frame, with the minimum degree of inconsistency.
Definition 17. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and Φ be a bounded frame. The bounded degree of inconsistency of (Π, Φ), denoted MicroInc(Π, Φ), is defined as follows.
We can use this measure for giving a measure of inconsistency for a knowledgebase ∆ when there is a case for a bounded frame Φ that is in some sense representative of the knowledge. For example, if ∆ is a set of ground literals, then a bounded frame containing just one model that satisfies exactly the literals in ∆ is in a sense representative of the knowledge in ∆. The second reason we introduce the bounded degree of inconsistency is that we use it as part of the definition of the unbounded degree of inconsistency that we introduce in the next section. We get MicroInc(Π, Φ) = 0 when Φ is a finite set of finite models for a knowledgebase that is consistent according to classical logic, and we get MicroInc(Π, Φ) = 1 when Φ is a finite set of finite models for a "completely inconsistent" knowledgebase (i.e. a knowledgebase for which each model of the knowledgebase, and for each atom in the language of the knowledgebase, the model satisfies the atom and its negation).
Proposition 2.
For all knowledgebases ∆, and for all sets of predicate symbols Π, if ∆ ⊥, and Φ = {E | E ∈ Models(∆) and |Domain(E)| ≤ n for some n ∈ N}, then MicroInc(Π, Φ) = 0.
Proof. Φ is a nonempty bounded frame. Since ∆ ⊥ there is an E ∈ Φ such that Inc(Π, E) = 0. Hence, MicroInc(Π, Φ) = 0.
2
The definitions of Inc and MicroInc are quite general definitions characterizing inconsistency for several reasons: they actually support the use of diverse logics (not just tolerant logics) for generating the models of a knowledgebase, the definitions are based on frames rather than knowledgebases, and they are able to focus attention on particular predicates rather than all predicates used in the knowledgebase or language, thus providing a finer grained analysis of inconsistency.
Unbounded degree of inconsistency
Now we consider how to measure inconsistency in unbounded frames. An unbounded frame may contain infinite bistructures; however, in the measure we define we consider only the finite bistructures in the frame. In particular, this means that if the frame consists of the models of a knowledgebase, we restrict consideration to the finite models. In the following definition we identify a function that for each n ∈ N gives the bounded degree of inconsistency for the bistructures with domain of cardinality n.
Definition 18. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, let Φ be an unbounded frame, and for each n ∈ N, let
So we can consider an unbounded frame as a sequence of bounded frames Φ[n] (each of which contain just bistructures of domain size n), then obtain the bounded degree of inconsistency of Φ[n] for each n, and then represent this sequence of values by a univariate function which we call a discord function. Whilst in general, the discord function f Φ Π is just a summary of the inconsistency arising in the bistructures in Φ, for some frames, the discord function is particularly interesting for our purposes. To consider some of these, we define the concept of a special type of rational function that we call a special function.
Figure 1: Examples of discord functions f Φ Π such that Φ is Models(∆ i ) with different knowledgebases ∆ i and with different sets of predicate symbols Π j . In each case, the discord function is a rational function.
Definition 19.
A special function is a function r : N → [0, 1] of the following form where r 1 and r 2 are each a nonnegative and nondecreasing univariate polynomial function such that for all n ∈ N r 2 (n) = 0, 0 ≤ r 1 (n) ≤ r 2 (n), and
For some classes of frames, we can show that the discord function is a special function. In Examples 10 and 12 each discord function is a rational function. We give some further examples for discord functions below and in Figure 1 . Now we define the unbounded degree of inconsistency as a special function for an important class of unbounded frames.
Definition 20. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, Φ an unbounded frame, and let f Φ Π be the corresponding discord function. Suppose that there is a special function
h Φ Π such that (1) for all n ≤ n 0 , f Φ Π (n) = h Φ Π (n), and (2) for all n > n 0 , f Φ Π (n) = h Φ Π (n). We call h Φ Π the unbounded
degree of inconsistency for (Π, Φ).
If an unbounded frame Φ for Π, written (Φ, Π), has an unbounded degree of inconsistency, we call it a smooth frame. We also let Threshold(h Φ Π ) be the lowest value for n 0 where n 0 ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Examples 10 -13 illustrate smooth frames. In particular, for Example 13, h Φ Π (n) = 3/n and Threshold(h If ∆ is consistent according to classical logic, and Φ = Models(∆) then h Φ Π (n) = 0 = f Φ Π (n), for all n > 1, because for any such n ∈ N, either there is no model of size n or there is a model of size n with no collisions. We excluded the case of n = 1 because of examples such as the consistent theory ∆ = {∃x.P (x), ∃x.¬P (x)} that has a collision in a model of size 1. In contrast, we can characterize a "maximally inconsistent" model as follows.
Proposition 3. If for all
, then for each arity m predicate symbol P ∈ Π, and for all E ∈ Φ, E |= ∀x 1 , .., x m .P (x 1 , ..., x m ) ∧ ¬P (x 1 , ..., x m )
Proof. Since f Φ Π (n) is always 1, every atom must be involved in a collision. 2
To illustrate how the unbounded degree of inconsistency can be useful, we give two examples of ontologies presented in classical logic. As discussed in Section 2, we can adopt the following conventions: (1) A concept P is represented by a monadic predicate P (x); (2) An individual c that is a member of a concept P is represented by a ground predicate P (c); (3) The relationship that the concept Q is a subconcept of the concept P is represented by ∀x.Q(x) → P (x); and (4) The relationship that the concept Q is disjoint with the concept P is represented by ∀x.Q(x) → ¬P (x) ∧ ∀x.P (x) → ¬Q(x).
Example 15. Let ∆ be the following set of formulae where instance c is member of disjoint concepts.
If Π = {P, Q, R, S} and Φ = ConceptModels(∆), then for all E ∈ Φ,
) E |= S(c) E |= ¬P (c) E |= ¬Q(c) E |= ¬R(c) E |= ¬S(c)
Hence, for all E ∈ Φ, if |E| = n then Min({CollisionCount(Π, E)}) = 4 and UniverseCount(Π, E) = 4n. Example 16. Let ∆ be the following set of formulae where (1) states that T and U are disjoint concept, (2) states that T and U are the same concept, and (3) states that T and U comprise everything. 
and d ∈ Domain(E), then according to (3) either E |= T (d) or E |= U (d) (or both). Assume w.l.g. that E |= T (d). Then by (1) E |= ¬U (d) and by (2) E |= U (d). Applying (1) again yields E |= ¬T (d). Hence, for all
Let Π = {P, Q, R, S, T, U } and Φ = ConceptModels(∆). Now for any E ∈ Φ and for any d ∈ Domain(E), it is possible to just make E |= ¬P (d), E |= ¬Q(d), E |= ¬R(d), and E |= ¬S(d) with no collisions for the predicates P , Q, R, and S. Therefore, f As we showed in Example 14 not all unbounded frames are smooth. However, the following result shows that if we consider all the models of a knowledgebase ∆ (i.e. Models(∆) ), or if we consider UNAModels(∆), or if we consider ConceptModels(∆), then there is an unbounded degree of inconsistency for any Π, and hence such a class of models is a smooth frame. Proof. We start with the case where Φ = Models(∆) and Π is the set of all predicate symbols in ∆. It is known that for all n ∈ N, Φ[n] = ∅ (where Φ[n] contains the models of size n in Φ). What is needed is to show that the discord function f Φ Π is a special function after a possible threshold value, i.e. f Φ Π (n) = r 1 (n)/r 2 (n) where r 2 (n) is never 0, for all n ∈ N, 0 ≤ r 1 (n) ≤ r 2 (n), and r 1 and r 2 are univariate nondecreasing polynomial functions. Since for all E ∈ Φ[n], UniverseCount(Π, E) is the same, let r 2 (n) = UniverseCount(Π, E) for some E ∈ Φ[n]. Clearly, r 2 can never be 0 because the domains and Π are not empty. Also, let r 1 (n) = Min({CollisionCount(Π, E)|E ∈ Φ[n]}). We have previously observed that 0 ≤ Inc(Π, E) ≤ 1 for all Π and E, hence 0 ≤ r 1 (n) ≤ r 2 (n) holds for all n ∈ N. So we must show that both r 1 and r 2 are nondecreasing univariate polynomial functions. By definition both are univariate functions. It remains to show that both r 1 and r 2 are nondecreasing polynomial functions.
We start with r 2 . We can actually compute UniverseCount(Π, E) for E ∈ Φ[n] as follows. Suppose Π contains the predicate symbols P 1 (m 1 ), . . . , P k (m k ) (the arities are in parentheses). Then r 2 (n) = UniverseCount(Π, E) = n m1 + . . . + n m k . This is a polynomial, although it may have to be simplified to write in standard form. Clearly, r 2 is nondecreasing.
Computing r 1 can be quite complex for an arbitrary ∆. What we need to show is that r 1 is nondecreasing and polynomial. It is clear that r 1 is nondecreasing after a threshold of n = 1 because as we enlarge a model by adding a domain element, the number of collisions cannot decrease. There may be a problem in the special case of going from 1 to 2 elements, for example, if ∆ = {∃x.P (x), ∃x.¬P (x)}. So it remains to show that r 1 is a polynomial function. We do not give all the details here but explain the basic idea through an example. At the end of this subsection we actually calculate r 1 for some special cases.
Consider the case where Π = {P (2)} and there are no constant or function symbols in the language. Recall that to compute r 1 (n) we try to find the minimal number of collisions in a model of size n. We choose 4 statements in ∆ that cause collisions, taking care of all quantifier combinations (for arity 2): (1) ∃x, y.P (x, y) ∧ ¬P (x, y) (2) ∃x, ∀y.P (x, y) ∧ ¬P (x, y) (3) ∀x, ∃y.P (x, y) ∧ ¬P (x, y) (4) ∀x, y.P (x, y) ∧ ¬P (x, y) The minimal number of collisions for (1) is 1, for (2) and (3) is n, and for (4) is n 2 . What happens is that for each argument an existential quantifier provides a multiplicative factor 1 while a universal quantifier provides a multiplicative factor n. This does not change even if there is a mix of different quantifiers, such as (5) ∀x, ∃y.P (x, y) ∧ ∃x, ∀y.¬P (x, y) However, we may have to subtract overlaps and recognize when there are no collisions such as for (6) ∃x, y.P (x, y) ∧ ∃x, y.¬P (x, y) (except for the case n = 1 that we have eliminated). The important point is that every number we get for collisions must be n i for some i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ Arity(P ), including the number of elements in an overlap. Adding and subtracting such powers of n always yields a polynomial. Now suppose that Π contains the predicate symbols P 1 (m 1 ), . . . P k (m k ) as given above. Then for any P j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the minimal number of collisions is calculated as above for P except that now we get powers of n up to the largest arity of the predicate symbols. So far, implicitly we have restricted our analysis to conjunctions. In the case of disjunction, such as θ = θ 1 ∨. . .∨θ t we take the minimum number of collisions in any of the θ i 1 ≤ i ≤ t, while implication can be rewritten using disjunction (and negation). In all cases the calculation yields a sum of powers of n with subtractions, also powers of n for overlaps, and hence the result is a polynomial. A similar argument works if Π is a subset of the predicates in ∆.
Let us now consider the case where the language contains constant and function symbols. For the purpose of counting collisions we can always interpret a function symbol as a constant function in which case it has the effect of a constant symbol in counting collisions (as discussed in Section 2). So we need not deal separately with function symbols. But a constant symbol has the same effect as an existential quantifier, so for example, (7) ∃y.P (c, y) ∧ ¬P (c, y) gives the same number of minimal collisions as (1). This completes the proof for the case where Φ = Models(∆). 
There are n collisions. However E ∈ Ψ. For E to satisfy the requirement for a concept model, d must also be in I + (Q). This requires adding n collisions. In the general case the number of collisions that must be added will again be a power of n, so r 1 is still a polynomial.
Finally, we consider the case where Γ = UNAModels(∆). Let n ∆ be the number of different constant symbols in ∆ or 1 if there are none. Here the proof for Φ[n] goes through for Γ[n], n ≥ n ∆ . Hence the same result holds but with Threshold(h
Using the proof of this theorem we can show that when the knowledgebase is exclusively ground formulae (i.e. there are no variables), then the numerator of the discord function is a constant.
Proposition 4. Let ∆ be a knowledgebase which incorporates no variable symbols, and let Π be a set of predicate symbols. If Φ = Models(∆), or Φ = ConceptModels(∆), or Φ = UNAModels(∆), then there is an m ∈ N, and n 0 ∈ N, such that for all n ∈ N, where n > n 0 , the numerator of h Φ Π (n) is m. Proof. Clearly, ∆ must have at least one constant symbol. Now recall from the proof of the Theorem 1 that each constant symbol acts as an existential quantifier from the point of view of counting collisions. Also, each existential quantifier yields a multiplicative factor of 1. Hence there are no terms in the polynomial for r 1 (the numerator) with n i for i > 0, so it must be a constant. We can actually get an upper bound on m as follows. If there are t predicate symbols then m ≤ t for Φ = Models(∆) and Φ = ConceptModels(∆), because we can identify all the constant symbols with a single element in the domain of the model and each predicate symbol causes at most one collision. Here n 0 = 0. The calculation is more complicated in the case where Φ = UNAModels(∆) because all constant symbols must be interpreted as different elements of D. Suppose ∆ contains c constant symbols and the predicate symbols are: P 1 (k 1 ), . . . , P q (k q ). Then the number of collisions for any E ∈ Φ of size ≥ c (there are no models of size < c) must be at most c k1 + . . . + c kq whose sum is the upper bound for m with n 0 = c − 1. 2
We can compare discord functions using the following ordering relation. Π) is less or equally inconsistent with (Φ , Π ).
Definition 21. The discord ordering, denoted , is defined as follows, where
Next we show by examples that the discord function is not monotonic. 
We noted in Example 18 that Φ 3 is not a smooth frame. In fact, for smooth frames, the discord function is monotonic in Φ.
Proposition 5. If Φ 1 and Φ 2 are both smooth frames and
Proof. Let Φ 1 ⊆ Φ 2 for smooth frames Φ 1 and Φ 2 where the corresponding special functions are h , we obtain for all n > n 0 , h
For a knowledgebase ∆, let Con(∆) = {Γ ⊆ ∆ | Γ ⊥} be the set of consistent subsets of ∆. The set of maximally consistent subsets of ∆ is defined as follows.
Also let Free(∆) = MaxCon(∆) be the set of formulae that are in all maximally consistent subsets of ∆. These may be regarded as the uncontroversial formulae in ∆ since they do not appear in any minimally inconsistent subset of ∆ (where a minimally inconsistent subset of ∆ is a subset Γ of ∆ such that Γ is inconsistent and for all Γ ⊂ Γ, Γ is consistent).
The following result shows that if a formula θ is not involved in any inconsistency in ∆ ∪ {θ}, then adding θ to ∆ cannot make the inconsistencies in ∆ worse.
Proposition 6. Let Φ 1 = Models(∆), and
Π . In case α contains only nonlogical symbols in ∆, then we have UniverseCount(Π, E 1 ) = UniverseCount(Π, E 2 ), and so f
In the proof of Theorem 1 we gave a general argument to explain why the discord function is a special function for a smooth frame. Now we give specific results for some special cases.
Proposition 7. Let ψ be a sentence of the form Q 1 x 1 , .., Q k x k .P (t 1 , .., t m )∧¬P (t 1 , .., t m ) where {x 1 , .., x k } ⊆ {t 1 , .., t m }, and {x 1 , .., x k } = ∅, and each t i ∈ {t 1 , .., t m } \ {x 1 , .., x k } is a constant symbol, and Q 1 , .., Q k ∈ {∀, ∃}. If Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P }, then
Proof If ψ is of the form Q 1 x 1 , .., Q k x k .P (t 1 , .., t m )∧¬P (t 1 , .., t m ), then for each n, there is an E ∈ Φ[n], with a minimal number of collisions, such that CollisionCount(Π,
is a universal quantifier, because all n domain elements are involved in collisions, and d i = 1 if Q i is an existential quantifier, because one domain element must be involved in a collision.
For example, consider ψ = ∀x, y, ∃z.P (x, y, z)∧¬P (x, y, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P }, we get f Φ Π = n 2 /n 3 = 1/n. Also consider ψ = ∀y, ∃z.P (a, y, z) ∧ ¬P (a, y, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ }), and Π = {P }, we get f Φ Π = n/n 3 = 1/n 2 .
Corollary 1. Let ψ be a sentence of the form ∀x 1 , .., x k .P (x 1 , .., x k )∧¬P (x 1 , .., x k ). If Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P }, then f Φ Π (n) = 1. Corollary 2. Let ψ be a sentence of the form ∃x 1 , .., x k (P (t 1 , .., t m )∧¬P (t 1 , .., t m ) ). If Φ = Models({ψ}), and
When ψ is a sentence of the form Q 1 x 1 , .., Q k x k .P (t 1 , .., t m )∧¬P (t 1 , .., t m )∧P (t 1 , .., t m )∧¬P (t 1 , .., t m ) where {x 1 , .., x k } ⊆ {t 1 , .., t m , t 1 , .., t m } and {x 1 , .., x k } = ∅, and each t i ∈ {t 1 , .., t m } is either a variable symbol or a constant symbol, and P = P , we can obtain the special function for the models of each of the following using Proposition 7 and then sum them.
For example, consider ψ = ∀x, y, ∃z.P (a, y, z) ∧ ¬P (a, y, z) ∧ P (x, y, z) ∧ ¬P (x, y, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P, P }, we get f
Similarly when ψ is a sentence of the form
., t m ) where {x 1 , .., x k } ⊆ {t 1 , .., t m , t 1 , .., t m } and {x 1 , .., x k } = ∅, and each t i ∈ {t 1 , .., t m } is either a variable symbol or a constant symbol, we can obtain the special function for the models of each of the following using the above result, then obtain the special function by taking their sum minus their overlap.
For example, consider ψ = ∀x, y, ∃z.P (a, y, z) ∧ ¬P (a, y, z) ∧ P (x, b, z) ∧ ¬P (x, b, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P }, we get f Φ Π = (2n − 1)/n 3 .
Inconsistency in the limit for smooth frames
We now consider the limit behaviour of the unbounded degree of inconsistency for smooth frames. In the limit, lim n→∞ f Φ Π = lim n→∞ h Φ Π , so it suffices to write only one of these functions. An advantage of considering the limit is that we can identify a measure of inconsistency that is a rational number in the [0, 1] interval. This provides a simple summary of the unbounded degree of inconsistency for a knowledgebase.
Theorem 2. If f Φ Π is a discord function, and Φ is a smooth frame, then there is a rational number
Π be a discord function, and let Φ be a smooth frame. By definition, there is an n 0 such that for all n > n 0 , f Φ Π is a special function. Therefore, there are polynomials
Since, q = p or q < p, we have the following two cases.
Therefore, there exists a rational number k 
Then for all E ∈ Φ, there is a P ∈ Π such that E |= ∀x 1 , .., x p .P (x 1 , .., x p ) ∧ ¬P (x 1 , .., x p ).
Proof. Since f Φ Π is a discord function for a smooth frame, for all n > n 0 , f
) is a special function, and so, for all n > n 0 , Min({Inc(Π, E) | E ∈ Φ[n]}) is a special function. This implies that for all n > n 0 , the following is a special function:
Since, for all n, for all E, E ∈ Φ[n], UniverseCount(Π, E) = UniverseCount(Π, E ), we can rewrite the above as
Using the proof of Theorem 1, (2) implies that there is an arity p predicate symbol P ∈ Π, and therefore from (1) and the fact that c p = 0 and the highest power of n is p, it follows that for all E ∈ Φ, there is an arity p predicate symbol P ∈ Π, such that E |= ∀x 1 , ..,
The next result is basically the reverse of Theorem 2. Proof. Let k = s/t where 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Let r 1 (n) = s × n and r 2 (n) = t × n. Clearly, r 1 and r 2 are both nondecreasing and nonnegative univariate polynomial functions such that for all n ∈ N (r 1 (n)/r 2 (n)) = k. Now we construct a knowledgebase ∆ , such that Φ = Models(∆), and Π is the set of all predicate symbols used in ∆, so that
Let Π have t monadic predicate symbols. So for any n, and any E ∈ Φ[n],
Then we continue the construction by putting s formulae into ∆ of the form ∀x.P i (x) ∧ ¬P i (x) using s different predicate symbols available in Π. So, for any n,
Example 21. For k = 2/5, if ∆ = {∀x.P 1 (x)∧¬P 1 (x), ∀x.P 2 (x)∧¬P 2 (x)}, and Π = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 }, all unary predicate symbols, then for each n, r 1 (n) = 2 × n and r 2 (n) = 5 × n. Hence, lim n→∞ f Φ Π (n) = 2/5. So whilst (Π, Φ) may be inconsistent for any finite bistructure, in the limit it may be consistent (i.e. k may be 0). Intuitively, this means that the "inconsistent part" of the knowledge becomes "infinitely insignificant" in the limit. We use this result to give us the following nomenclature for a discord function f So by Proposition 9, a knowledgebase without variable symbols is always 0-inconsistent in the limit. 
and there is a polynomial e 0 + e 1 n + e 2 n 2 + ... + e s n s such that ., x p .P (x 1 , .., x p ) ∧ ¬P (x 1 , .., x p ) for any arity p predicate symbol P . This remains the case if some predicate symbols are removed from Π, hence k = 0.
(Case 2) k > 0. This means that q = p and hence there are c q predicate symbols P 1 , . . . , P cq , such that Φ |= ∀x 1 , ..,
As long as all of these arity n predicate symbols stay in Π , we obtain s = q = p and c q = e s . So
Since we are primarily interested in measuring inconsistency in knowledgebases, the unbounded degree of inconsistency, in the form of a special function, is an efficient way of describing and analysing inconsistency in knowledgebases that have finite models. Furthermore, with the unbounded degree of inconsistency, we can categorize the models for a knowledgebase as being either consistent in the limit (i.e. k = 0) or inconsistent in the limit (i.e. k > 0). Though note that the discord function gives a finer distinction than the k in the limit: Consider for example two discord functions f and f with the same limit but for which f Φ Π f Φ Π holds (such as 1/n 2 and 1/n).
Infinite degree of inconsistency
Now we turn to measuring inconsistency in bistructures with infinite domains. We have already argued that infinite domains arise in diverse applications in artificial intelligence and computer science, such as when reasoning about temporal knowledge. Unfortunately, when we consider infinite domains, we are unable to consider inconsistency as a ratio of the number of collisions in a model and the size of the universe. Therefore we need to take a more abstract approach for extending our framework to analyse infinite frames adequately. To this end, we introduce the macrotypes poset.
Definition 23. The macrotypes poset is a poset (≤ m , {∞ , ∞ ⊥ }) where ∞ ≤ m ∞ ⊥ We call ≤ m the macrotype ordering and we call {∞ , ∞ ⊥ } the macrotypes.
For knowledgebases ∆ that are consistent by classical logic (i.e. ∆ ⊥) we have the following result for the infinite degree of inconsistency.
Proposition 13. Let ∆ be a knowledgebase and let Π be a set of predicate symbols. If ∆ ⊥, then MacroInc(Π, Models(∆)) = ∞ .
Similarly, if a knowledgebase is "completely inconsistent", then we have the following result for the infinite degree of inconsistency.
Proposition 14. Let ∆ be a knowledgebase and let Π be a set of predicate symbols. If for all E ∈ Finite(Models(∆)), Inc(Π, E) = 1, then MacroInc(Π, Models(∆)) = ∞ ⊥ .
Proof. Let Φ = Models(∆). If for all E ∈ Finite(Φ), Inc(Π, E) = 1, then by Proposition 3, we must have for all E ∈ Finite(Φ), E |= ∀x 1 , ..,
The following result shows that for any knowledgebase ∆, there is a "continuity" of the measurement of inconsistencies going from the subframe Finite(Models(∆)) to the subframe Infinite(Models(∆)). 
Since k > 0, it follows that q = p. As shown in Proposition 8, the only way this is possible is if we have at least one arity p predicate symbol P ∈ Π for which for all E ∈ Φ, E |= ∀x 1 . . .
However, if Φ is k-inconsistent in the limit, and k = 0, then it is not necessarily the case that MacroInc(Π, Φ) = ∞ , as illustrated by the following example.
Example 25. Consider a language that has a unary predicate P 1 and a binary predicate P 2 . Let ∆ = {∀x.P 1 (x) ∧ ¬P 1 (x)}. Here Φ is 0-inconsistent in the limit but MacroInc(Π, Φ) = ∞ ⊥ for Π = {P 1 , P 2 }.
Framework for measuring consistency
We can extend our analysis of inconsistency by also measuring "harmonies". We view this as the complement to CollisionCount(Π, E), as explicated in the following definition for harmony.
Definition 26. Let E be a bistructure, where D = Domain(E) and let Π be a set of predicate symbols.
where for each arity n predicate symbol P i , Harmony(
We can now use HarmonyCount(Π, E) as a second dimension, along with CollisionCount(Π, E), to compare models. We can use this for both finite models and infinite models, but for finite models, with CollisionCount(Π, E), we can calculate HarmonyCount(Π, E), whereas for infinite models, we cannot calculate HarmonyCount(Π, E) from CollisionCount(Π, E).
Consider a finite model with 5 elements for a language with a unary predicate R 1 and a binary predicate R 2 . There are 5 atoms for R 1 and 25 for R 2 , altogether there are 30 atoms. Suppose that for this model there are 4 collisions. Then there must be 30-4=26 "harmonies". There is no need to deal separately with the number 26 because if another finite model with 5 elements for the same language has 3 collisions, it must have 27 harmonies and the second dimension is irrelevant for comparing harmonies.
The situation is different for infinite models. Suppose an infinite model for the same language has infinitely many collisions. That does not tell us how many harmonies there are. Furthermore, suppose that D 1 has infinitely many collisions and 0 harmonies, while D 2 has infinitely many collisions and 5 harmonies and D 3 has infinitely many collisions and infinitely many harmonies. It would be very reasonable to say that D 3 is the least inconsistent model, D 2 is next, and D 1 is the most inconsistent. To capture this idea, we require the following notion of a profile.
For the rest of this section, we will only deal with infinite bistructures.
Definition 27. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and E a bistructure. The profile of (Π, E), denoted Pro(Π, E), is defined as follows.
Using the profile function, we define an ordering relation over profiles as follows.
Definition 28. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and E 1 and E 2 bistructures. If Pro(Π, E 1 ) = a 1 , b 1 and Pro(Π, E 2 ) = a 2 , b 2 , then the profile ordering, denoted ≤ Π , is defined as follows.
Also let E 1 < Π E 2 denote that E 1 ≤ Π E 2 , and E 2 ≤ Π E 1 , and let E 1 ∼ Π E 2 denote that E 1 ≤ Π E 2 , and
So if E 1 ≤ Π E 2 , then E 1 is less inconsistent than, or equally inconsistent with, E 2 . 
The profile of (Π, Φ) is defined as Pro(Π, Φ) = a, b .
Example 31. Let Φ 5 be the frame {E i |i ∈ N} where E i = (N, I We can compare profiles using the following profile ranking. 
Tolerant logic generalizes Belnap's logic
We now compare our presentation of tolerant logic with Belnap's four-valued logic. We only deal with the ground portion of FOL, because Belnap's four-valued logic is propositional. Let G ⊆ Formulae(L) be the set of ground formulae in L that involve the ¬, ∨ and ∧ symbols. So if θ ∈ G, then θ contains no variable symbols nor any quantifier symbols. An interpretation in Belnap's four-valued logic is a truth assignment t that for the atoms of G assigns a value in {T, F, N, B}, and for an arbitrary formula θ ∈ G, t(θ) is defined by the truth tables for Belnap's four-valued logic given in Tables 1 to 3 . The lattice ordering is given as B > T , B > F , T > N , and F > N . In particular, t(θ) ≥ T iff t(θ) = B or t(θ) = T .
Definition 32. Let t be a Belnap truth assignment, t : G → {T, F, N, B}, and let E be a bistructure. t represents E for all atoms in G iff for all atoms α ∈ G, the following constraints hold for t and E.
t(α) = N iff E |= α and E |= ¬α t(α) = F iff E |= α and E |= ¬α t(α) = T iff E |= α and E |= ¬α t(α) = B iff E |= α and E |= ¬α
For θ ∈ G, the satisfaction relation for tolerant logic, given by |=, coincides with the semantics for Belnap's four-valued logic as shown by the following result.
Theorem 5. Let t be a Belnap truth assignment t : G → {T, F, N, B}, and let E be a bistructure such that t represents E for A. For θ ∈ G, t(θ) ≥ T iff E |= θ α N F T B ¬α N T F B Table 1: Truth table for Proof By induction on the length of a formula. The base case is where θ is a literal. Then t(θ) ≥ T iff E |= θ by Definition 32. For the induction we assume the inductive hypothesis that t(α) ≥ T iff E |= α and t(β) ≥ T iff E |= β. The following 5 cases exhaust all the possibilities and complete the proof.
Case 1: θ is of the form α ∧ β.
t(α ∧ β) ≥ T iff t(α) ≥ T and t(β) ≥ T by Table 2 iff E |= α and E |= β by the inductive hypothesis iff E |= α ∧ β by Definition 5
Case 2: θ is of the form α ∨ β.
t(α ∨ β) ≥ T iff t(α) ≥ T or t(β) ≥ T by Table 3 iff E |= α or E |= β by the inductive hypothesis iff E |= α ∨ β by Definition 5
Case 3: θ is of the form ¬(α ∧ β).
t(¬(α ∧ β)) ≥ T iff t(α ∧ β) ≥ F by Table 1 iff t(α) ≥ F or t(β) ≥ F by Table 2 iff t(¬α) ≥ T or t(¬β) ≥ T by Table 1 iff E |= ¬α or E |= ¬β by the inductive hypothesis iff E |= ¬(α ∧ β) by Definition 5
Case 4: θ is of the form ¬(α ∨ β).
t(¬(α ∨ β)) ≥ T iff t(α ∨ β) ≥ F by Table 1 iff t(α) ≥ F and t(β) ≥ F by Table 3 iff t(¬α) ≥ T and t(¬β) ≥ T by Table 1 iff E |= ¬α and E |= ¬β by the inductive hypothesis iff E |= ¬(α ∨ β) by Definition 5
Case 5: θ is of the form ¬¬α.
t(¬¬α) ≥ T iff t(α) ≥ T by Table 1 iff E |= α by the inductive hypothesis iff E |= ¬¬α by Definition 5 2 Whilst Belnap's four-valued logic is a simple, intuitive and well-known proposal, there are some interesting, though more complex proposals, that are variants of Belnap's proposal, such as a proposal by Arieli and Avron that has a preferential semantics which selects those models for a knowledgebase that are minimal with respect to the assignment of the B truth value [AA98] . These variants on Belnap's proposal may offer some useful developments of the framework for analysing inconsistent information presented in this paper.
Discussion
The need to develop robust, but principled, logic-based techniques for analysing inconsistent information is increasingly recognized as an important research area for artificial intelligence in particular, and for computer science in general. This interest stems from the recognition that the dichotomy between consistent and inconsistent set of formulae that comes from classical logics is not sufficient for describing inconsistent information.
A number of proposals have been made for measuring the degree of information in the presence of inconsistency [Loz94, WB01, Kni03, KLM03] , and for measuring the degree of inconsistency in information [Gra78, Kni01, Hun02, Kni03, KLM03, Hun04, Hun03, GH06, HK06]. For a review see [HK04] .
These measures are potentially important in diverse applications in artificial intelligence, such as belief revision, belief merging, negotiation, multi-agent systems, decision-support, and software engineering tools. Already, measuring inconsistency has been seen to be a useful tool in analysing a diverse range of information types including news reports [Hun06] , integrity constraints [GH06] , information merging [QLB05] , ontologies [MQHL07] , software specifications [BPF04, MJLL05] , and ecommerce protocols [CZZ04] .
The current proposals for measuring inconsistency can be classified in two ways. The first approach involves "counting" the minimal number of formulae needed to produce the inconsistency. The more formulae needed to produce the inconsistency, the less inconsistent the set [Kni01] . This idea is an interesting one, but it rejects the possibility of a more fine-grained inspection of the (content of the) formulae. In particular, if one looks to singleton sets only, one is back to the initial problem, with only two values: consistent or inconsistent.
The second approach (which includes the proposal presented in this paper) involves looking at the proportion of the language that is touched by the inconsistency. This allows us to look inside the formulae [Hun02, KLM03, GH06] . This means that two formulae (singleton sets) can have different inconsistency measures. In these proposals one can identify the set of formulae with its conjunction (i.e. the set {ϕ, ϕ } has the same inconsistency measure as the set {ϕ ∧ ϕ }). This means that the distribution of the contradiction among the formulae is not taken into account.
Recently, there has been a proposal to combine the first and second approaches in a unified framework [HK06] . The framework, based on coalitional game theory, supports inconsistency measures that are able to look inside the formulae, but also to take into account the distribution of the contradiction among the different formulae of the set, allowing for the identification of the blame/responsibility of each formula of the knowledgebase in the inconsistency.
All the proposals discussed above are based on propositional logic, apart from [Gra78] , which deals mainly with infinite models, and [GH06] which is based on a restricted form of first-order logic. So the proposal in this paper, based on tolerant logic, is the first proposal for measuring inconsistency in first-order knowledge. This potentially offers considerable advantages for applications in artificial intelligence and computer science involving first-order logic.
